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[Crim. No. 5892. In Bank.

Oct. 11, 1956.J

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. STEPHEN STUART,
Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Intent.-Union of act and intent or criminal
negligence is an invariable element of every crime unless it is
excluded expressly or by necessary implicatiou. (Pen. Code,
§20.)
[2] Drugs and Druggists-Pure Drugs Act-Adulteration and Misbranding.-Public welfare statutes such as Health & Saf.
Code, § 26280, prohibiting the preparation or sale of an adulterated or misbranded drug, are not ordinarily governed by Pen.
Code, § 20, and therefore call for the sanctions imposed
though the prohibited acts are committed without criminal
intent or criminal negligence.
[S] Homicide-Manslaughter-Lack of Due Caution and CircumBpection.-Pen. Code, § 192, defining manslaughter, is governed
by Pen. Code, § 20, making unity of act and intent essential

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 85 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal
Law, § 24.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Drugs and Druggists, § 12 et seq.
[3] Homicide through culpable negligence, note, 161 A.L.R. 10.
See also Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 152 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide,
§ 209 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 16; [2, 8] Drugs and
Druggists, § 1(1); [3] Homicide, § 27; [4-6] Homicide, § 26; [7]
Statutes, § US.
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to constitute a crime, and the phrase "without due caution and
circumspection" in § 192 is therefore the equivalent of criminal
negligence.
ld.-Manslaughter-Unlawful Act not Amounting to Felony.Since Pen. Code, § 20, making unity of act and intent essential
to constitute a crime, applies to the phrase "unlawful act" in
Pen. Code, § 192, defining manslaughter, a pharmacist's act in
filling a prescription calling for the addition of pure sodium
citrate, by adding a compound from a bottle labeled sodium
citrate which contained a mixture of sodium citrate and sodium
nitrite, must be committed with criminal intent or CJ,"iminal
negligence to be an unlawful act within the meaning of § 192;
and by virtue of its application to both phrases, § 20 precludes the incongruity of imposing on the morally innocent
the penalty (Pen. Code, § 193) appropriate only for the
culpable.
ld.-Manslaughter-Unlawful Act not Amounting to Felony.To be an "unlawful act" within the meaning of Pen. Code,
§ 192, the act in question must be dangerous to human life
or safety and meet the conditions of Pen. Code, § 20, requiring
unity of act and intent to constitute a crime.
ld.-Manslaughter-Unlawful Act not Amounting to Felony.Where a pharmacist, in filling a prescriptioJl calling for the
addition of pure sodium citrate, did not know and could not
reasonably be expected to know that a sodihm citrate bottle
contained nitrite, the conditions of Pen. Cod~, § 20, requiring
unity of act and intent to constitute a crim-e, were not met
and there was therefore lacking the culpability necessary to
make the act an unlawful act within the lueaning of Pen.
Code, § 192, defining manslaughter, and he co,tld not properly·
be convicted of such offense because use of the medicine caused
a child's death due to the presence of sodiUDt nitrite.
Statutes-Construction-Penal Statutes.-Whan language reasonably susceptible of two constructions is Qsed in a penal
law ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to
the offender will be adopted, particularly where one of the
proposed constructions would impose absolute criminal liability
and make a felony of an act that involves no culpability.
Drugs and Druggists-Criminal Offenses-Deviation From Prescription.-The purpose of Pen. Code, § 380, making it a
felony if death results because a dealer in drugs or medicines
wilfully or ignorantly deviates from the terms of a prescription, is to enforce "care and caution" on the part of dealers
in drugs, and to protect the pUblic against one who dispenses
drugs in ignorance of their properties and proper uses; it was
not the purpose to impose criminal liability without fault for
accidents having no relation to failure to use the knowledge
and skill required for dispensing drup.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial.
Stanley Mosk, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for manslaughter and for violation of Pen.
Code, § 380, prohibiting a druggist from deviating from a
prescription. Judgment of conviction reversed.
John N. Frolich, William Levin and F. Bruce McMullen
for Appellant.
Dean M. McCann as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Edward M.
Belasco, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was charged by information
with manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192) and the violation of
section 380 of the Penal Code. He was convicted of both
offenses by the court sitting without a jury. His motions for
a new trial and for dismissal (Pen. Code, § 1385) were denied,
sentence was suSpended, and he was placed on probation for
two years. He appeals from the judgment of conviction and
the order denying his motion for a new trial.
Defendant was licensed as a pharmacist by this state in
1946 and has practiced here since that time. He holds a
B.S. degree in chemistry from Long Island University and a
B.S. degree in pharmacy from Columbia University. In
April, 1954, he was employed as a pharmacist by the Ethical
Drug Company in Los Angeles.
On July 16, 1954, he filled a prescription for Irvin Sills.
It had been written by Dr. D. M. Goldstein for Sills' 8-day-old
child. It called for "sodium phenobarbital, grains eight. Sodium eitraie, drams three. Simple Syrup, ounces two.
Aqua peppermint, ounces one. Aqua distillate QS, ounces
four. " Defendant assembled the necessary drugs to fill
the prescription. He believed that the simple syrup called
for was unavailable and therefore used syrup of orange. The
ingredients were incompatible, and the syrup of orange precipitated out the phenobarbital. Defendant then telephoned
Dr. Goldstein to ask if he could use some other flavoring. Dr.
Goldstein told him that since it was midnight, if he could not
find any simple syrup "it would be just as well to use another
substance, elixir mesopine, P .B. " Defendant spoke to a clerk
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and learned that there was simple syrup behind the counter.
He mixed the prescription with this syrup, put a label on the
bottle according to the prescription, and gave it to Sills.
Sills returned home, put a teaspoonful of the prescription in
the baby's milk and gave it to the baby. The baby died a few
hours later.
Defendant stipulated that there was nitrite in the pref>cription bottle and that "the cause of death was methemoglobinemia caused by the ingestion of nitrite." When he compounded the prescription, there was a bottle containing sodium
nitrite on the shelf near a bottle labeled sodium citrate. He
testified that at no time during his employment at the Ethical
Drug Company had he filled any prescription calling for
sodium nItrite and that he had taken the prescribed three
drams of sodium citrate from the bottle so labeled.
On August 11, 1954, another pharmacist employed by the
Ethical Drug Company filled a prescription identical with
the Sills' prescription. He obtained the sodium citrate from
the same bottle used by defendant. The prescription was
given to an infant. The infant became ill but recovered.
In the opinion of Dr. Goldstein, it was suiIering from
methemoglobinemia. An analysis of this prescription by a
lIniversity of Southern California chemist disclosed that it
contained 5.4 grams of sodium nitrite per 100 cc's and 4.5
grams of sodium citrate per 100 cc's.
An analysis made by the staff of the head toxocologist for
the Los Angeles County coroner of the contents of the bottle
given to Sills disclosed that it contained 1.33 drams of sodium
citrate and 1.23 of sodium nitrite. An analysis made by
Biochemical Procedures, Incorporated, a laboratory, of a
sample of the contents of the bottle labeled sodium citrate
disclosed that it contained 38.9 milligrams of nitrite per gram
of material. Charles Covet, one of the owners of the Ethical
Drug Company, testified that on the 17th or 18th of October,
-ltJ54, he emptied the contents of the sodium citrate bottle,
washed the bottle but not its cap, and put in new sodium
citrate. A subsequent analysis of rinsings from the cap gave
strong positive tests for nitrite. Covet also testified that when
he purchased an interest in the company in April, 1950, the
bottle labeled sodium citrate was part of the inventory, that
no one had put additional sodium citrate into the bottle from
that time until he refilled it after the death of the Sills child
Jand that he had never seen any other supply of sodium
citrate iD. the store.

)
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There is nothing in the reeord to indicate that the contents
of the bottle labeled sodium citrate could have been identified
as containing sodium nitrite without laboratory analysis. There
was testimony that at first glance sodium citrate and sodium
nitrite are identical in appearance, that in form either may
consist of small colorless crystals or white crystalline powder,
that the granulation of the crystals may vary with the manufacturer, and that there may be a slight difference in color
between the two. The sUbstance from the bottle labeled sodium
citrate was exhibited to the court, but no attempt was made to
compare it with unadulterated sodium citrate or sodium nitrite. A chemist with Biochemical Procedures, Incorporated,
testified that the mixture did not appear to be homogeneous
but that from visual observation alone he could not identify
the crystals as one substance or the other. Defendant testified
that he had no occasion before JUly 16th to examine or fill
any prescription from the sodium citrate bottle.
No evidence whatever was introduced that would justify
an inference tha t defendant knew or should have known that
the bottle labeled sodium citrate contained sodium nitrite.
On the contrary, the undisputed evidence shows conclusively
that defendant was morally entirely innocent and that only
because of a reasonable mistake or unavoidable accident was
the prescription filled with a substance containing sodium
nitrite. [1] Section 20 of the Penal Code l makes the union
of act and intent or criminal negligence an invariable element
of every crime unless it is excluded expressly or by necessary
implication. (People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.?d 798, 801 [299
P.2d 850].) Moreover, section 26 of the Penal Code lists
among the persons incapable of committing crimes" [p] ersons
. who committed the act or made the omission charged under
an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal
intent" (subd. 4), and" [p]ersons who committed the act
or made the omission charged through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil design, intention,
or culpable negligence." (Subd. 6; see also Pen. Code,
§§ 195, 199.) The question is thus presented whether a
person can be convicted of manslaughter or a violation of
section 380 of the Penal Code in the absence of any evidence
of criminal intent or criminal negligence.
The answer to this question as it relates to the conviction

)

S"In every crime or public offense there must exist a lUlion, or ,joint
operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence."

)
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of manslaughterS depends on whether or not defendant committed an "unlawful act" within the meaning of section 192
of the Penal Code when he filled the prescription. The
attorney general contends that even if he had no criminal
intent and was not criminally negligent, defendant violated
section 26280 of the Health and Safety Code and therefore
committed an unlawful act within the meaning of section 192
of the Penal Code.
Section 26280 of the Health and Safety Code provides:
"The manufacture, production, preparation, compounding,
packing, selling, offering for sale, advertising or keeping for
sale within the State of California ... of any drug or device
which is adulterated or misbranded is prohibited. "8 In view
of the analysis of the contents of the prescription bottle and
the bottle labeled sodium citrate and defendant's stipulation,
there can be no doubt that he prepared, compounded, and
sold an adulterated and misbranded drug.
[2] Because of the great danger to the public health and
safety that the preparation, compounding or sale of adulterated or misbranded drugs entails, the public interest in
demanding that those who prepare, compound, or sell drugs
make certain that they are not adulterated or misbranded,
and the belief that although an occasional nonculpable offender
may be punished, it is necessary to incur that risk by imposing
strict liability to prevent the escape of great numbers of
culpable offenders, public welfare statutes like section 26280
are not ordinarily governed by section 20 of the Penal Code
and therefore call for the sanctions imposed even though the
prohibited acts are committed without criminal intent or
criminal negligence. (See Peop~e v. VogeZ, fttpra, 46 Ca1.2d
·"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without
malille. It is of three kinds:
1. Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
2. Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful alit, not amounting
to felony; or in the commission of a lawful alit whieh might produce
death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and cirllumspeetion; provided that this subdivision shall not spply to allts committed
in the driving of a vehillle. • • ." (Pen. Code, § 192.)
·"A drug shall be deemed to be adulterated ••• (4) if any substanlle
has been (a) mixed or paeked therewith so as to reduce its quality or
strength; or (b) substituted wholly or in part therefor." (Health &
Saf. Code, ~ 26235.)
.. The term 'misbranded' shall apply to all drugs or devices, the
package or label of which bears any statement, design, or emblem regarding such article or the inlrredients or snb~tane.es contained therein which
(Health & Saf.
shall be false or misleading in any particular.••• "
Code, § 26240.)

)
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798, 801, note 2; Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum.
L.Rev. 55,72-75; Hall, Prolegomena To.A. Science of Oriminol
Law, 89 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 549, 563-569.)
[3] It does not follow, however, that such acts, committed
without criminal intent or criminal negligence, are unlawful
acts within the meaning of section 192 of the Penal Code,
for it is settled that this section is governed by section 20
of the Penal Code. Thus, in People v. Penny, 44 Ca1.2d
861,877-880 [285 P.2d 926], we held that "there was nothing
to show that the Legislature intended to except section 192
of the Penal Code from the operation of section 20 of the same
code" and that the phrase "without due caution and circumspection" in section 192 was therefore the equivalent of
criminal negligence. [4] Since section 20 also applies to the
phrase "unlawful act," the act in question must be committed with criminal intent or criminal negligence to be an
unlawful act within the meaning of section 192. By virtue
of its application to both phrases, section 20 precludes the
incongruity of imposing on the morally innocent the same
penalty (Pen. Code, § 193) appropriate only for the culpable.
Words such as "unlawful act, not amounting to felony" have
been included in most definitions of manslaughter since the
time of Blackstone (4 Bl. Comm. Homicide § 191; see Riesenfeld, Negligent Homicide: .A. Study in Statutory Interpretation, 25 Cal.L.Rev. 21~22) and even since the time of Lord
Hale, "unlawful act" as it pertains to manslaughter has been
interpreted as meaning an act that aside from its unlawfulness
was of such a dangerous nature as to justify a conviction of
manslaughter if done intentionally or without due caution.
(See Moreland, Law of Homicide 186-187, 244, citing 1 Hale,
Pleas of the Crown (ed. of 1778) 471-475; Foster, Crown
Law (2d ed. 1791) 259; 1 East, Pleas of the Crown (1803)
257.) [6] To be an unlawful act within the meaning of
section 192, therefore, the act in question must be dangerous
to human life or safety and meet the conditions of section
20. (See People v. Mitchell, 27 Ca1.2d 678, 682-684 [166 P.2d
10] ; People v. Pearne, 118 Cal. 154, 158 [50 P. 376] ; Thiede v.
State, 106 Neb. 48 [182 N.W. 570-572, 15 A.L.R. 237];
People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562 [199 N.W. 373, 374, 35 A.L.R.
741] ; Potter v. State, 162 Ind. 213 [70 N.E. 129, 131, 102
Am.St.Rep. 198, 64 L.R.A. 942] ; State v. Oope, 204 N.C. 28
r167 S.E. 456, 458] ; D.j,xon v. State, 104 Miss. 410 [61 So.
423, 45 L.R.A.N.S. 219].)

)
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It follows, therefore, that only if defendant had intentionally or through criminal negligence prepared, compounded,
or sold an adulterated or misbranded drug, would his violation
of section 26280 of the Health and Safety Code be an unlawful act ·within the meaning of section 192 of the Penal Code.
Thus, in People v. Penny, supra, in discussing section 7415
of the Business and Professions Code, which prohibits the use
by licensed cosmetologists of a solution of more than 10 per
cent phenol on a human being, we said that had the defendant
been a licensed cosmetologist, she would have been guilty
of violating section 7415 and therefore of an unlawful act
within the meaning of section 192 of the Penal Code. The
defendant in that. case knew that she was using such a
solution. The intentional or criminally negligent use of such
a solution on a human being by a licensed cosmetologist in
violation of section 7415 of the Business and Professions Code
would clearly meet the conditions of section 20 of the Penal
Code and would therefore be an unlawful act within the
meaning of section 192. [6] When, as in this case, however,
the defendant did not know, and could not reasonably be
expected to know, that the sodium citrate bottle contained
nitrite, those conditions are not met and there is therefore
lacking the culpability necessary to make the act an unlawful
act within the meaning of section 192.
The crucial question with respect to defendant's conviction
under section 380 of the Penal Code· is whether he "ignorantly" deviated from Dr. Goldstein's prescription. The
attorney general contends that defendant acted "ignorantly"
because he did not know and was therefore "ignorant" of the
fact that the sodium citrate bottle contained nitrite, and
that it is therefore immaterial that he had the professional
knowledge that one should have to dispense drugs and could
not reasonably be expected to know that the sodium citrate
bottle contained nitrite. Defendant, on the other hand, con·At the time defendant filled the presllription lelltion 380 provided:
"Every apothellary, druggist, or person carrying on business as a dealer
in drugs or medieines, or J;lerson employed as clerk or salesman by Bueh
person, who, in putting up any drug or medicines, or making up any
presllription, or filling any order for drugs or medillines, willfully, negligently, or ignorantly omits to label the same, or puts an untrue label,
stamp, or other designation of contents, upon any box, bottle, or other
pallkage containing any drugs or medillines, or substitutes a different
article for any article prescribed or ordered, or puts up a greater or less
quantity of any article than that presllribed or ordered, or otherwise
deviates fom the terms of the presllription or order whieh he undertakes
to follow, in consequence of whieh human life or health is endangered, is
pllQ- of a JDisc1aneanor. or: if cieath ensues, is .,wt;r of a felaaT."

)
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tends that he did not act "ignorantly," since he had the
knowledge of drugs and the technical skills required to dispense them, that he could not reasonably be expected to know
that the sodium citrate bottle contained nitrite or to make a
chemical analysis of its contents before filling the prescription,
and that since there was nothing to show that he lacked the
knowledge he was required to have or that he failed to use
that knowledge, section 380 does not apply.
A definitive answer to these conflicting contentions cannot
be gleaned from the dictionary, on which both parties rely,
for the definitions therein can be read to support either
contention.1I [7] "When language which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law ordinarily
that construction which is more favorable to the offender will
be adopted." (People v. Ralph, 24 Ca1.2d 575, 581 [150 P.2d
401].) This rule is particularly pertinent here, where one
of the proposed constructions would impose absolute criminal
liability and make a felony of an act that involves no culpability whatever. We do not base our decision on that ground
alone, however, for we are convinced that it is clear from the
history and purpose of section 380 that it did not impose
criminal liability without fault.
[8] Section 380 was enacted in 1872 when anyone could
lawfully sell drugs in this state. It was based on section
445 of the Penal Code of New York (1864), and a footnote to
that section, adopted by the California Code Commissioners
as a note to section 380, stated, "The frequent occurrence
of accidents, involving, often, even the loss of human life,
through mistakes in putting up prescriptions, render necessary'
some legislation to enforce care and caution on the part of
dealers in drugs." (Italics added.) There was no intimation
of a purpose to impose criminal liability without fault, and
the qualifying words of the section "willfully, negligently,
or ignorantly" belie any such purpose. As the commissioners'
note indicates, the legislation was designed to enforce "care
and caution" on the part of dealers in drugs. Obviously a
-Webster'. New International Dictionary, 2d ed. Unabridged, 1948,
defines "ignorance" as "want of knowledge in general, or in relation
to a partieular subject." It defines "ignorant" as .. [d]estitute of knowledge; uninstructed or uninformed ••• [u]ninformed (in); unaware
(of); as, I am ignorant in this subject; he was ignorant of that tact"
and states that" [o]ne is ignorant who is without knowledge, whether
in general or of lome partiC1llar thing." (Italics added.) The italicized
words lend support to one contention, the remaining words lend 8upport
to the other.
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person does not act with "care and caution" who dispenses
drugs in ignorance of their properties and proper uses, and
we believe that it was to protect the public against such
ignorance that section 380 was enacted.
The Legislature's preoccupation with such ignorance is also
indicated by its enactment in the same year of the first pharmacy law in this state designed to confine the dispensing of
drugs to those of proven knowledge and competency. (Stats.
1871-1872,p. 681.) This law, known as the San Francisco
Pharmacy Act, regulated the practice of pharmacy and the
dispensing of medicines and poisons in the City and County
of San Francisco. It confined the right to dispense drugs
or :fill prescriptions to graduate pharmacists, licentiates in
pharmacy, practicing pharmacists, and practicing assistant
pharmacists, and prescribed the educational qualifications and
experience that each must have. This act was repealed in
1883, but a state-wide act based thereon was enacted in 189!.
(Stats. 1891, p. 86.) Other legislation followed, and in 1937
the present state-wide statute for the protection of the public
against ignorance in the handling of drugs was enacted. (Bus.
& Prof. Code, §§ 4000-4256, as amended.) In 1955, after the
alleged offense herein was committed, the Legislature amended
section 380 by deleting the word "ignorantly" and substituting therefor "without consideration of those facts which
by use of ordinary care and skill he should have known."
This change removed the ambiguity arising from the use of the
word "ignorantly" and made it abundantly clear that it
was never the purpose of the statute to impose criminal liability without fault for accidents having no relation to a
failure to use the knowledge and skill required for the dispensing of drugs. (See Elbert, Ltd. v. Gross, 41 Cal.2d 322,
327 [260 P.2d 35], and cases cited.)
The judgment and order are reversed.
Gibson, ,C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J.,
and McComb, J., concurred.

